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Abstract: One aspect in which nonfinancial corporations are said to be 
financialised is that they have been increasingly engaging in financial 
accumulation from which they derive a growing proportion of financial 
income. This is what we call the financial turn of accumulation hypothesis. 
In this article we show that the evidence used to sustain it, in the US 
setting, has to be reconsidered. Our findings show that, contrary to the 
financial turn of accumulation hypothesis, financial income averages 2.5% 
of nonfinancial corporations’ total income since the 1980s, oscillating since 
the beginnings of the 1990s until 2005 and then declining. In terms of 
assets, some of the alleged financial assets might actually reflect other 
activities in which nonfinancial corporations have been increasingly 
engaging such as tax avoidance, internationalization of production, 
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Financialisation is nowadays a buzzword. More than that perhaps, the buzzword of the 2010s, 
as Christophers (2015) claims. Starting originally in a Marxist tradition (Magdoff & Sweezy, 
1987), it has later expanded to broader heterodox economic literature, typically post-
Keynesian (G. A. Epstein, 2005), economic geography (Christophers, 2012), parts of 
mainstream sociology (Lin & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013) and, very recently, it can even be found 
in mainstream economics (Admati, 2017). Such a wide disciplinary and theoretical usage has 
come with a lack of precision or, the flip side of this, a multiplicity of approaches. 
Van der Zwan (2014) finds three different strands: financialisation as a change in everyday life, 
as a change in corporate management (the introduction of shareholder value maximization) 
and as a new regime of accumulation. Lapavitsas (2013, pp. 3–4)  puts forward a different 
(class-based) analysis, distinguishing among changes in nonfinancial corporations (NFCs), banks 
and households. We find this a clearer distinction as it allows for a better identification of each 
actor involved. The focus of this paper will be the financialisation of the NFC. 
Even when considering a narrower scope, such as the financialisation of the NFC, there is no 
general agreement on the precise dynamics it involves. Table 1 shows some of the most-cited 
papers regarding the financialisation of the NFC. On one side it confirms, as in Van der Zwan 
(2014), that shareholder value orientation and the financialisation of the NFC have been 
sometimes used as synonyms reflecting the growing relevance of shareholders over the rest of 
stakeholders of the firm, especially the labour force. On the other hand, it puts a specific 
dimension for NFCs which is their engagement in financial activities. The literature has 
identified two different channels for this engagement. The first is related to the increased 
transfer of earnings from NFCs to financial markets in various forms such as interest payments, 
dividend payments, and stock buybacks. This channel is closely linked to the primacy of 
shareholder value orientation since the increase in share buybacks and dividends starting in 




& O’Sullivan, 2000). It also reflects the results of increased leverage through interest payment. 
The second channel is related to the increased acquisition of financial assets from which NFCs 
derive a growing proportion of financial income.  
[Table 1] 
Regarding the latter, it is claimed that the involvement in financial activities has been 
dramatic: the ratio of financial assets to nonfinancial assets has gone from 40% in 1950 to 
120% in 2001 (Orhangazi, 2008, p. 866) -95% if we update to 2017-, while the ratio of portfolio 
income has gone from less than 10% in 1950 to 40% in 2001 (Krippner, 2005, p. 185) -20% if 
we update to 2013, last information available. Hence, according to Krippner (2005, p.181), 
financialisation implies the fact that both at the macroeconomic level and for NFCs, “profit-
making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than trade and commodity 
production”. In a similar fashion, Davis (2016, p. 138) states that there has been a “shift in NFC 
activities toward banking activities”.  
However, in this article we will scrutinize the empirical evidence used to support those types of 
claims, or what we define as the financial turn of accumulation hypothesis. We define this 
hypothesis following the meaning given in Table 1, that is, as the contention that there has 
been an aggregate trend in which NFCs are increasingly acquiring financial assets in order to 
obtain a higher proportion of their income out of them.1 To underscore, we are concerned 
here with the general trend, whilst understanding that there could be significant variation in 
particular firms, as cases studies have shown (Froud, Johal, Leaver, & Williams, 2006) and we 
will confirm. 
We will focus on the main pieces of evidence that have been adduced: the increase in financial 
assets held by NFCs and the increase in financial income received by NFCs, while also analyzing 
 
1 Durand and Gueuder (2018, p. 128) propose the term “financial turn of accumulation” to define the 
narrative that “suggests a substitution of financial investments at the expense of real investments as the 
strategy of lead firms shifted towards higher short-term profitability through financial incomes at the 
expense of productive investment.” We follow the definition closely although without focusing on the 
substitution of one type of investment for another but rather studying financial investment and financial 




their cash flow statements. We will concentrate on the United States of America (USA) 
between 1950 and 2016 since this is where most of the literature is focused. 
In order to perform our analysis, we make use of three different and complementary 
databases. The Federal Reserve’s Financial Accounts of the USA (FAUSA) and the Statistics of 
Income (SOI) from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provide aggregate, domestic information 
for all corporations. Moreover, the latter present information disaggregated by size of assets. 
The third database is Compustat firm-level information for listed US corporations that presents 
consolidated data for the parent company along with its national and international 
subsidiaries. This provides an approximate notion of the worldwide activity of those firms. 
Additionally, Compustat allows us to present a novel analysis of NFC’s total sources and uses of 
cash based on their Cash Flow Statement. 
The main contribution of this paper is to show that financial accumulation was not a significant 
strategy verified in aggregate terms for NFCs. Some of the assets taken into account to support 
the financial turn of accumulation hypothesis are, in fact, intangibles and FDI. In terms of 
income, financial income has increased in the last decades but remained around 2.5% of total 
income since 1980, even decreasing in the last years. As stated by Fiebiger (2016), if NFCs are 
specializing in financial activities in order to make profits outs of them, it seems that the result 
has not been positive overall. These results also hold when we distinguish among different 
sizes of enterprises.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revises the literature that suggests a 
movement to finance, or what we call the financial turn of accumulation hypothesis. Section 3 
presents the data and section 4, the methodology. Section 5 shows, separately, the results 
from the empirical analysis of asset, income and cash flow composition. Section 6 focuses on 
differences by size while Section 7 discusses the results. We finally give some concluding 





2. Moving to finance 
This idea can be traced back to the Monopoly Capital thesis. In an economy trapped in a state 
of stagnation, as characterized by Baran and Sweezy (1966), regular ways of absorbing 
surpluses such as capitalist consumption and investment become insufficient. Speculation 
appears as one of the new channels for mopping up surpluses (Magdoff & Sweezy, 1987). 
Although not necessarily sharing the idea of a stagnant economy, Crotty (2005) and Orhangazi 
(2008) also state that NFCs started using, in the beginnings of the 1980s, an increased 
percentage of their internal funds to buy financial assets and financial subsidiaries, or to start 
new financial arms themselves. For Krippner (2011) the degree of high labor militancy at home 
and increased international competition abroad induced nonfinancial firms to withdraw capital 
from production and divert it to financial markets. Similarly, Davis (2016) states that due to 
declining profitability, slower global aggregate demand growth and increased exchange rate 
volatility, NFCs shifted away from fixed capital toward financial assets. In Stockhammer (2004) 
and Tomaskovic-Devey et al (2015), the emphasis is put on a shift in management preferences 
caused by the hostile take-over movement and changes in pay structure which aligned their 
interests with shareholders´. Due to these transformations, NFCs became more rentier-like 
abandoning growth-oriented priorities and started investing in financial markets.  
Both macro (Crotty, 2005; Krippner, 2011; Orhangazi, 2008) and micro (Davis, 2016; Froud 
et al., 2006) level data have been used in favor of the financial turn of accumulation 
hypothesis. Among the former, the increase in the ratio of financial assets to non-financial 
assets based on the FAUSA, which went from 40% in 1950 to 120% in 2001, is usually used to 
show the movement from productive to financial activities (Orhangazi, 2008, p. 866). This is 
complemented with a ratio that intends to show an increasing share of income coming from 
financial sources (Krippner, 2005, p. 185). In the case of the micro evidence, we find scholars 
focusing either in some case studies as in Froud et al (2006) or analysis based on the 




the asset structure of NFCs towards financial assets and a declining gap between the cost of 
borrowing and the financial income for large NFCs. 
In terms of econometric analysis, in most of the cases, the objective is to estimate the impact 
of the financialisation of NFC on capital expenditures distinguishing the two different channels 
we made reference in the previous section: the increased transfer of earnings from NFCs to 
financial markets in various forms such as interest payments, dividend payments, and stock 
buybacks (Orhangazi, 2008, p. 877) and the flow of income that nonfinancial corporations earn 
due to their investment in financial assets and financial subsidiaries such as interest and 
dividend income (Orhangazi, 2008, p. 877). The latter is, evidently, the closest to the financial 
turn of accumulation hypothesis. Results on this channel are mixed: while Hecht (2014, p. 32) 
and Auvray & Rabinovich (2019) find no statistically significant effect of financial income on US 
NFCs’ real investment decisions, Stockhammer (2004, p. 735) and Orhangazi (2008, p. 880) do 
find negative statistically significant effect in some specifications. Conversely, Davis (2017) 
finds a positive and significant effect of financial assets, for all firms, and financial profitability, 
for big firms.   
3. Data 
One of the novelties of this paper is to deal, simultaneously, with three different and 
complementary databases. Table 2 provides a summary of the information used in this paper 
contained by each of them. In all cases we are dealing with corporations, i.e. we do not take 
into account the noncorporate sector. The FAUSA and SOI provide aggregate and separate 
information for financial and nonfinancial corporations. In both cases the distinction is based 
on the main activity reported by the firm following the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
used in years prior to 1998 and the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
after 1998. Compustat provides firm level information for listed companies which we 




firms identified by the primary codes from 6000 to 6799 as well as those cases in which the  
industry format belongs to ‘financial services.’ 
[Table 2] 
All the information we use from these databases is standardized and consolidated. The latter 
represents an advantage since we are including information from financial subsidiaries. In the 
case of the SOI and FAUSA, the consolidation is done at the domestic level while in Compustat 
it is domestic and international. The latter also allows to identify firms individually while the 
SOI cover up to 15 different asset sizes (updated over the years). By means of this we are able 
to study the different dynamics involved in small and medium corporations compared to that 
of listed ones which are usually the biggest of the economy. For example, in 2013, only 4,955 
listed NFCs held 69% of the assets of 4,943,231 NFCs reported in the SOI. 
For the asset analysis, we will use the three databases although focusing on the FAUSA and 
Compustat since the former presents the most disaggregated list of Assets while the latter is 
the only one that allows to identify a particularly important asset for our argument, Goodwill. 
The SOI will be used to analyze the differences in terms of asset size. Finally, the FAUSA allow 
to distinguish those assets held outside the USA in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).   
For the sources of income we will base our study on the SOI and Compustat. While the former 
has the largest number of items and many of them are different types of financial income, the 
latter allows to identify another type of financial income: that belonging to the financial 
divisions of some NFCs. 
For the Cash Flow Statement we will only focus on Compustat. The FAUSA also have this kind 
of data but the information is presented in more detail in Compustat. For instance, while 




separately, the FAUSA only show net information. The complete list of items used in Figures 
and Tables is available in Table A1.2   
4. Methodology 
The methodological discussion, both for asset and income composition, is related to two broad 
topics: what is considered as a financial asset/income and how its evolution is measured. For 
the asset analysis, the first question is relevant since, as Crotty (2005) and Orhangazi (2008) 
recognize, practically the entire increase in financial assets over total assets is due to a residual 
variable, ‘unidentified miscellaneous assets’, which is considered as financial by the FAUSA. 
Identifying individually the assets it contains, with the help of Compustat, will be fundamental 
to assess whether or not there has been such an increase in financial assets. 
The second question relates to measurement. With a very similar aim as ours, Davis (2016) 
carries out an exhaustive analysis of NFCs’ balance sheet considering four categories of 
financial assets in Compustat –‘cash and short-term investments’, ‘total current receivables’, 
‘other investments and advances’, and ‘other financial assets’. In her case, those categories are 
normalized by sales in order “to avoid possible biases stemming from the fact that an increase 
in financial assets relative to assets requires by definition a decline in nonfinancial assets 
relative to assets” (Davis, 2016, p. 118). However, if we are telling a story about how NFCs 
become more intensive in financial assets, by definition, this is compared to other types of 
assets. Normalizing by sales fails to capture this dimension because, a priori, all types of assets 
could be able to increase. Therefore, we chose to normalize by total assets.3 
In terms of sources of income, using different datasets Krippner (2005, p. 185) -SOI-, Crotty 
(2005, p. 107) -SOI-, Orhangazi (2008, p. 866) -FAUSA- and Davis (2016, p. 135) -Compustat- 
arrive at similar conclusions: basically, that financial income has become a significant source of 
 
2 In terms of overlapping among categories, the comparisons we carry for assets (FAUSA vs. Compustat) 
and income (SOI vs. Compustat) in all cases suffer from different geographical scope which makes an 
exact matching impossible. Nevertheless, as we mentioned before, we see this as an advantage rather 
than a flaw considering the different types of dynamics they show and that the results are consistent for 
all the performed analyses.  




income for NFCs. The measurement discussion is relevant because, although Orhangazi (2008, 
p. 865) intends to show that NFCs are “deriving an increasing share of their income from 
financial sources”, and Krippner (2005, p. 182), the “growing importance of ‘portfolio income’ 
… relative to revenue generated by productive activities”, in practice they do not measure 
NFCs’ financial income relative to total income. Instead, they measure financial income relative 
to some measure close to profits. For Krippner, it is profits plus depreciation allowances, while 
for Orhaganzi it is operating surplus. 
As shown in the mathematical Appendix, this type of ratio can give meaningless results in 
which the cost of financial activities is increasing (so profit is decreasing) and, ceteris paribus, 
the ratio of portfolio income is increasing. As Crotty himself (2005, p. 105) notes: “caution is 
required in interpreting the meaning of this time series because the numerator does not 
deduct the cost of acquiring and holding financial assets, while the denominator includes 
profit, which is a net revenue concept. This gives an upward bias to this series that could be 
substantial”. Krippner (2005, p. 183) also acknowledges this fact and that is why she takes into 
account depreciation allowances, although she recognizes that “even augmented by 
depreciation allowances, corporate cash flow is still a net-of-cost measure”. Therefore, the 
overestimation problem still persists. 
The best way to compute the importance of financial activities for NFCs would be to calculate 
financial profit as a percentage of total profit. Accurate information to do so, however, is not 
available. Although there are various items related to income from financial activities, the 
associated costs which are exclusive to financial activities are impossible to gauge with existing 
information which, in most of the cases, is limited to financial expenses. Computing all 
financial expenses would overestimate the cost of acquiring and holding financial assets since, 
for example, financial expenses include interest from debt taken to finance productive 
activities. Available information can only provide a rough idea of the financial position of NFCs. 




income as a percentage of total income. By doing so, we eliminate all possible bias arising from 
comparing a pure revenues stream with a net-of-cost measure.  
Regarding the components of financial income, Kripner (2005, p. 182) and Crotty (2005, p. 105) 
consider income from interest payments, dividends and capital gains from investment while 
Orhangazi (2008, p. 866), interests and dividend income. The selection of these items can pose 
two shortcomings: one of overestimation and other of underestimation. The former is related 
to including dividends from domestic and foreign corporations as part of financial income since 
they may perfectly be related to non-financial activities held by subsidiaries. Conversely, the 
possibility of underestimating financial income is due to the way in which corporations fill their 
annual reports. Those corporations with a strong financial activity usually present income 
statements from their industrial and financial divisions consolidated.4 Therefore, an important 
proportion of financial income appears as part of total revenue in aggregate statistics. It is only 
with CCM (CRSP-Compustat Merged database) that we are able to identify income from the 
financial division although starting in 2010. 
Finally, for the Cash Flow Statement we compute the evolution of total sources and uses of 
funds. This analysis will allow to verify that of the asset and income structure.  
5. Results 
a. Asset structure 
Table 3 confirms that the most important change in terms of assets, using the FAUSA, has been 
the dramatic increase of ‘unidentified miscellaneous assets.’ 
[Table 3] 
Until 2010, the total financial assets not including miscellaneous items have, in fact, remained 
lower as a proportion of total assets than the decade of the 1960s. Figure 1 analyzes the 
evolution of those assets. While ‘money market fund shares’ display a small rise, it can be 
clearly observed that the major increase in ‘financial assets less unidentified miscellaneous 
 
4 See for example Ford Annual Report (2015, p. 106) , Volvo Annual Report (2015, p. 80) or General 




assets’ in fact derives from direct investment abroad which goes from 2% in 1946 to 12% in 
2015. The question is, then, about the ultimate goal of that FDI. 
Cross-border investment is considered as direct investment in international statistics when the 
ownership stake is at least of 10 per cent. With that threshold it is assumed a lasting interest 
with the intention to exercise control over the enterprise. This is how it is distinguished from 
foreign portfolio investment, much more related to short-term holding or speculation on 
foreign equity market. Financial studies also consider that threshold as an indication of 
exercising control over the company (see for example La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). Moreover, 84.7% of all US foreign 
affiliates are majority owned (Fiebiger, 2016, p. 5) and scholars who discuss the drivers of FDI 
usually characterize them either as market-seeking, efficiency-seeking or resource-seeking 
(Milberg & Winkler, 2013, p. 132); clearly more related to real or regular activities of the firm 
rather than financial purposes. In a nutshell, this indicates that financial speculation does not 
seem to be behind the increase in FDI. 
On the other hand, not speculating on foreign equity market does not mean that other types 
of financial income might not be pursued. As it is indicated in Figure 2, once we take into 
account the destination al FDI, especially in the last couple of years, it is clear that tax havens 
have been featuring prominently. Although the motives are usually associated to tax 
avoidance (Desai, Foley, & Hines Jr, 2006) we will later evaluate in Section 5b if some source of 
financial income is also at stake.   
[Figure 1, Figure 2] 
We now move to ‘unidentified miscellaneous assets’. Crotty (2005, p. 104) stated that, at the 
time of his research, even Federal Reserve economists didn’t know which kind of assets were 





Unidentified miscellaneous assets, which is calculated residually, may include such 
items as deferred charges and prepaid expenses, goodwill, other intangible assets, 
and intercorporate holdings of corporate equity. Intangibles can include such 
items as copyrights, patents, distribution rights and agreements, easements (gas, 
water, and mineral rights), franchises and franchise fees, trademarks, and client 
lists. 
It is worth noting that almost all these assets are intangibles rather than financial.5 
Consequently, sometimes they have been excluded from the broader list of financial assets 
(Doepke & Schneider, 2006). Among unidentified miscellaneous assets, goodwill has a relevant 
preponderance (Davis, 2016, p. 117). This asset is defined as the amount that an acquiring 
company pays for a target company over the target’s book value (IFRS 3 — Business 
Combinations). Theoretically, it is explained by the routines, procedures, cultures, etc. which 
are not individually identifiable but add to company’s value. In practice, given the difficulties to 
measure such items, the amount of goodwill depends on the fluctuations of the stock market, 
especially on the bull process verified in the weeks preceding M&A (Serfati, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the fact that goodwill has increased as a proportion of total assets has to be 
interpreted cautiously. This is due to the fact that goodwill is valued through impairment (IAS 
36 — Impairment of Assets). Contrary to amortization, by which assets’ value is reduced 
according to a specific schedule, impairment implies that the value of an asset, in this case 
goodwill, is decided by a test that compares the total profit expected to be generated by that 
asset with its book value. Therefore, goodwill does not necessarily disappear from the 
accounts throughout time.  
 
5 “Financial assets are entities over which ownership rights are enforced by institutional units, 
individually or collectively, and from which economic benefits may be derived by their owners by 
holding them, or using them over a period of time; they differ from other assets in the System of 
National Accounts in that there is a counterpart liability on the part of another institutional unit (except 





We confirm the more relevant role of intangibles using Compustat. Figure 3 shows that the 
most prominent change in the asset structure of NFCs is the increase in intangibles (‘goodwill’ 
+ ‘other intangibles’) which, starting from less than 0.5% in 1961 reaches around 25% in 2015. 
Since it started to be computed, ‘goodwill’ has been, in most of the years, around 50% of total 
intangibles (and closer to 60% since 2002). The remaining intangibles are defined by 
Compustat as ‘other intangibles’ which, as in the case of ‘goodwill’, have also little to do with 
financial assets. Most of the assets from ‘unidentified miscellaneous assets’ besides goodwill, 
such as patents, copyrights and licenses, are included in ‘other intangibles’. 
[Figure 3] 
However, the figure still portrays an increase in some financial assets. ‘Cash and short-term 
investments’ display a U-shaped curve starting in 10% of total assets in 1961, then falling to 5% 
in the beginning of the 1980s before increasing back to 10% in the 1990s where they have 
since remained. ‘Other assets’ have also increased, although this is a residual category that 
includes different types of assets.6 ‘Other investments and advances’ have also increased from 
2% in 1961 to 5% in the present. ‘Receivables’ present a discrete jump in 1988, from 11.8% to 
17.5% not due to a change in NFCs’ strategies but because of a change in regulation. In 
October 1987, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued its Statement No. 94 which 
tried to reduce the off-balance sheet financing by requiring the consolidation of all majority 
owned subsidiaries in financial statements (Wiedman & Wier, 1999). Parent companies had 
off-balance subsidiaries in order to transfer corporate receivables and leases, reporting only 
their net asset position in their own balance sheet improving their debt/equity, return on 
investment and receivables turnover ratios (Cormier, Andre, & Charles-Cargnello, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the proportion of ‘receivables’ has been decreasing since the discrete change. 
 
6 Although normalizing by sales, Davis (2016) also shows that the financial assets that increase are ‘cash 
and short-term investments’ and another asset that she defines as ‘other financial assets’. However, as 
shown in her appendix, ‘other financial assets’ are ‘other current assets’ (Compustat item 68) + ‘other 
assets’ (Compustat item 69). These are not necessarily financial assets. In Figure A1 in our Appendix we 




It is also important to remark that Compustat presents consolidated information and therefore 
we are not able to distinguish between parent and subsidiary information (i.e. it is not possible 
to assess the stock of FDI like we did in Figure 1). Being consolidated, on the other hand, 
implies that all subsidiaries are included, even the financial ones. 
On the other hand, if we compare the asset structure of NFCs and financial corporations (FCs) 
we can see in Figure 4 that for the latter: (1) the amount of ‘cash and short-term investments’ 
has decreased, instead of increased, over practically the whole period; (2) the main 
component is ‘receivables’ - more than 40%7; (3) ‘Other investments and advances’ comprise a 
higher proportion of assets.  
[Figure 4] 
Figure 4 also allows to calculate a rough benchmark in order to identify which NFCs resemble 
more the structure of FCs. Their two most important assets are ‘receivables’ and ‘other 
investments and advances’, which average 46% and 23% of total assets respectively. The 
former is a particularly important asset in the financial turn of accumulation hypothesis since it 
represents the monetary obligations owed to a company by its debtors or customers. We take 
an arbitrary lower percentage for NFCs and identify three cases which resemble the structure 
of FCs: a) NFCs with more than 40% of ‘receivables’ over total assets, b) NFCs with more than 
15% of ‘other investment and advances’ over total assets and c) NFCs with more than 35% of 
‘receivables’ over total assets and 10% of ‘other investment and advances’ over total assets. 
Figure 5 shows the results:  since the 1980s, an average of 7% and 5% of listed NFCs 
accomplish criteria a) and b) respectively, although with a clear lower trend. Moreover, only an 
average of 27 NFCs since 1980 meets criteria c) -less than 1%. In the case of FCs, 50%, 58% and 
28% respectively accomplish those criteria since the 1980s. 
[Figure 5]   
 
7 And it also presents a discrete jump in 1988, which confirms the fact that, both for FC and NFC, the 




In a nutshell, we consider that the validity of the financial turn of accumulation hypothesis is 
weakened once we take into account that: a) some of the alleged financial assets which also 
showed the highest growth are, in fact, FDI, goodwill and other intangibles, b) the most 
important financial asset for FCs, ‘receivables’, has been decreasing for NFCs at least since 
1988 and c) the number of NFCs with significant proportion of the two most important assets 
for FCs is less than 1% and has been decreasing since the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, 
even though some clear financial assets have increased, as in the case of ‘cash and short-term 
investments’,8 it does not necessarily mean that NFCs are making profits out of them. The 
same claim can be applied to less clear cases such as FDI. To effectively sustain this kind of 
argument we would need evidence showing to what extent financial income has displaced 
more ‘traditional’ sources of income. This requires, in other words, to examine the income 
statement of NFCs – the topic we analyze next. 
b. Sources of income 
Figure 6 illustrates the dramatic differences that arise depending on the denominator chosen 
to measure the relevance of financial income. On the right side we follow Krippner’s 
methodology and use cash flows (profits + depreciation allowances), on the left side we use 
revenues. It confirms the overestimation bias due to comparing a pure revenues stream with a 
net-of-cost measure. In Figure A2, in the Appendix, we compare two net-of-cost measures: 
financial profitability over total profitability. Although results are telling (the ratios tends to be 
negative for the whole period and worsens since the 1980s), they have to be interpreted 
cautiously since we compute all financial costs rather than those related only to financial 
activities. 
We will rather focus on the left side of Figure 6 which still tells a completely different story 
than the financial turn of accumulation hypothesis regarding the importance of that type of 
revenues on the general income structure of NFCs. Even considering dividends from foreign 
 




and domestic corporations (which are not necessarily financial), this type of income is usually 
below 2.5% and only in 2005 it surpassed the barrier of 3% due to a tax holiday on repatriated 
profits. If we only take gains on capital and noncapital assets and interests, the aggregate is 
usually below 2%. Moreover, financial income presents a clear upward trend until the 
beginnings of the 1990s, oscillates until 2005 and then dramatically declines (this also happens 
using Krippner’s methodology). The last two facts, but especially the decline are contradictory 
with the fact that the whole period belongs to what has been regarded a finance-led capitalism 
(Guttmann, 2016). 
The main component of financial income is always interest income. Fiebiger (2016, p. 11) 
shows that both interests received and paid share practically the same trend, which is also 
similar to the evolution of the interest rate. Therefore, the evolution of the main component 
of financial income seems to be more a by-product of monetary policy rather than an active 
speculative activity carried by NFCs. 
[Figure 6] 
Figure 7 shows the joint evolution of financial income and financial assets using Compustat in 
order to study whether or not there is any link among them. We measure the evolution of 
financial income using interest income and this is partly why the percentage is lower than in 
the SOI. Compustat does not provide consistent information on capital gains and we are not 
computing dividend income due to the reasons provided in Section 4 (basically, that there is no 
reason to consider it as financial income). In any case, even if we take into account dividends, 
the percentage does not surpass the 1% threshold in any year. Regarding capital gains, in 
Figure 6 we saw they play a minor role being interest income the most important. Taking all of 
this into account makes it valid to focus on interest income.9 Figure 7 points out, firstly, the 
fact that interest income is decreasing simultaneously with ‘cash and short-term investments’ 
increase which is a clear indication that the growth in the latter should not be linked to the 
 
9 In any case, in Figure A3 in the Appendix, we show that the evolution of financial income in SOI and 




quest for financial profits. Second, both types of investments and advances have remained 
fairly constant whereas financial income was decreasing. Just receivables display a clear 
downward trend as well. 
[Figure 7] 
Moreover, also using Compustat, we are able to identify the number of firms for which interest 
income represents a significative source of income (Figure 8). We take three arbitrary 
thresholds: 10%, 20% and 30%. The fact that, since the 1980s, only an average of 2.1% and 
1.6% of firms surpass the last two thresholds supports the fact that, if valid, the financial turn 
of accumulation hypothesis only applies for a small number of firms which is also decreasing in 
the last two decades.    
[Figure 8] 
Despite the evidence we have provided in order to reject financial turn of accumulation 
hypothesis, there is a certain probability that an important proportion of financial income 
might not be specified as such due to the fact that firms with a financial division consolidate its 
information with regular income. We face this potential issue using CCM database  which has a 
specific item for it (‘finance division revenue’). When we compute income from financial 
divisions we obtain an average of 0.5% of revenues for the whole sample. Although the 
number is minor, it is nevertheless impressive considering that only 34 corporations report 
income from financial divisions. It is in many of these cases (but not in all of them) where 
financial income represents a significant proportion of total income (Table 4). Moreover, all 
these NFCs are big: in 2010, 90% of them were in the upper quartile, 62% in the upper decile, 
38% in the top 5% and 24% in the top 1%.  
[Table 4] 
Having analyzed the income structure of NFCs we have presented data that, as in the case of 
the asset structure, tend to deny the financial turn of accumulation hypothesis. In particular 




even after adding income from finance divisions; (2) financial income has stopped increasing 
and even declined in a period characterized as financialized; and, finally, (3) financial income 
represents a significant income for a small and decreasing number of firms since the 
beginnings of the 2000s. In the next section, we study the remaining financial statement: the 
cash flow statement of NFCs. 
c. Cash Flow Structure 
The cash flow statement is a useful tool for assessing the sources (Figure 9) and uses (Figure 
10) of funds. In terms of the sources, ‘net increase in long term debt’ has been maintained as a 
permanent positive source of income, growing especially in moments of lower income from 
regular operations. This last item, until 2002, had a negative trend as a source of income, 
increasing later. The category ‘other funds from operations’ has also increased during the 
period. 
[Figure 9, Figure 10] 
Regarding the uses of funds, one of the most prominent changes is the decrease in capital 
expenditure across the period from 77% of total funds in 1977 to 34% in 2016. This decline was 
matched, as a counterpart, by an increase in the purchase of common and preferred stock 
from 1.5% in the beginnings of the 1970s to 20% in 2016 (and a reduction in the relative 
importance of dividends as a mean of distributing value to shareholders) along with 
acquisitions averaging 13.3% of total funds since mid-1980s. 
Regarding financial investments, their proportion is low: (1) ’net increases in investments’10 
has an average of 3.7% (and started the sample with 3.5%), (2) ’other investing activities’ 
displays an average of 2.5% and, finally, (3) ’changes in cash and cash equivalents’ alternated 
positive and negative values with an average of 2.6% and a period of systematic higher values 
 
10 We take the net value (difference between ‘increase in investments’ and ‘sale of investments’) 
because, due to the Statement No. 94 in 1988, the values of each them rise separately but the 
difference remains constant. ‘Increase in investments’ goes from 4.7% in 1987 to 25.6% in 1988 while 
‘sale of investments’ jumps from 2.6% to 24.4%. ‘Net increase in investments’ includes increase in long-
term receivables, increase in investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and long-term investments 




(1996-2005) in which it reached 13% in 2003. Therefore, Figure 10 does not show NFCs actively 
engaging in financial investments. 
To conclude, this section confirms the trends we found above.  Firstly, increases in acquisitions 
match increases in goodwill. Decreases in capital expenditure explain the decrease in net 
property, plant and equipment and positive sustained values for some financial categories 
might explain the increase in cash and short-term investments. Moreover, the fact that 
financial investments are not a major use of funds is conformant with the low proportion of 
financial income relative to total income. Finally, permanent positive values for net long-term 
debt issuance explains the increase in the liabilities of NFCs as pointed by Davis (2016, p. 128). 
So far, we have presented comprehensive evidence pointing towards the rejection of the 
financial turn of accumulation hypothesis as an aggregate trend among NFCs. However, there 
might still be the case that the aggregate data we presented hides significant variation across 
firm size and sector. In the next section we perform the same analysis we have done so far, 
this time for different sizes of NFCs. 
6. Size analysis 
In order to analyze size differences we use the SOI and Compustat. Figure 11 shows the asset 
structure of different sizes of firms.11 A couple of trends can be clearly distinguished. Starting 
from the lowest percentiles, all firm sizes show a clear increase in ‘cash, government 
obligations and other current assets’ met mainly by a decrease in ‘notes and accounts 
receivables less reserves for bad debts’ and also ‘inventories’. In these segments, ‘depreciable 
assets less accumulated depreciations’, ‘other capital assets less reserves’ (which includes 
intangibles) and ‘other investments and loans’ have remained fairly constant. 
This picture changes dramatically for the upper percentiles, especially within the top 1%. 
Firstly, the decrease in ‘depreciable assets’ as a percentage of total assets is concentrated in 
 
11 The percentiles are not arbitrary but based on how the SOI provides information (i.e. almost fixed 
categories for asset size during the whole period). Although it is not possible to distinguish percentiles in 




the upper segment of the distribution, mainly in the upper 0.1% but especially in the upper 
0.05%. This group also presents other interesting features. It is the only one in which there is 
no increase in ‘cash, government obligation and other current assets’. Moreover, it is also the 
only where we verify an increase in ‘other investments and loans’. This category is defined by 
the SOI as generally including: 
Long-term nongovernment investments and certain investments for which no 
distinction could be made as to their current or long-term nature. Examples of 
non-government investments included stocks, bonds, loans to subsidiaries, 
treasury stock reported as assets, and other types of financial securities. (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2013) 
[Figure 11] 
The definition is very broad and may include both financial and nonfinancial assets (also 
related to the international activities of NFCs). As we did in previous sections we are able to 
verify whether these ‘other investments and loans’ are related or not to a flow of financial 
income (Figure 12).12 
We show, for each percentile, the proportion of financial income over total income as we 
defined it in Section 4. For the upper 0.1% and especially for the 0.05%, financial income has 
increased as a percentage of income. Yet, the percentage does not surpass the 3.5% level for 
biggest firms and 1.4% for the 0.05%-0.1% segment. Figure 12 also allows us to check whether 
the increase in more clear financial assets -‘cash, government obligation and other current 
assets’- in other firm sizes was associated with an increase in financial income. For the 1%-10% 
and 10%-20% segments financial income was higher in 1961 and 1962 compared to 2004-
2013. Only in the 20%-40% and 40%-100% segments we observe some years in the recent 
period with higher financial income. However, it is never higher than 0.3% for the former and 
 
12 The SOI only presents the disaggregation of income by size for 1961, 1962 and 2004-2013. That’s why 




1% for the latter. These general trends are maintained also for the manufacturing sector 
(Figures A4 and A5 in the Appendix). 
[Figure 12] 
Finally, Figure 13 shows selected assets of NFCs belonging to the top 1% and lower 50% in 
asset size from Compustat. Differences are telling: even if in both cases a decrease in ‘net 
property, plant and equipment’ is verified, the biggest cut is experienced by the top 1%. The 
highest increases in ‘other intangibles than goodwill’ and ‘goodwill’ are also verified for this 
category. On the other hand, the most dramatic change in ‘cash and short-term investments’ 
happens for the lower 50%. This result is consistent with Figure 11 and confirms that, even for 
listed firms, the highest increase in liquid assets is verified for the smaller firms. 
[Figure 13]  
7. Discussion 
As we mentioned in Section 2, the alleged movement to finance was in a hostile context for US 
NFCs. Compared to the “relatively quiet and uncompetitive ‘60s” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1991, p. 
54), US corporations in the beginnings of the 1980s faced a number of major economic 
challenges: high inflation, high interest rates, low profits and increased foreign competition. 
Due to inflation, corporations’ real assets (i.e. property, plant, equipment) increased in value 
while high interest rates left corporations undervalued in the stock market (Fligstein & 
Markowitz, 1993). Moreover, at that time, stock market valuation suggested that in many 
cases the individual parts of the corporation were worth more than the combined entity 
(LeBaron & Speidell, 1987)13. 
In this situation, returns for shareholders were relatively low (Zey & Camp, 1996). However, 
contrary to the dispersal which had prevailed in previous decades, shareholders were 
increasingly organized in the form of pension and investment funds, some of them being highly 
active. In this way, they could exert pressure through the board of directors. Management also 
 




felt pressure through leveraged buyouts carried out by corporate raiders (Useem, 1996). This 
gave rise to two broad changes in corporate governance regimes: firstly a move to financial 
conceptions of the firm, according to which the company is a moldable set of assets, and 
secondly an emphasis on shareholder value maximization, which guides management to 
maximizing short-run returns on those assets (Fligstein, 2002; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000).  
In response to this new context, US NFCs underwent several changes. First, many corporations 
were taken over, broken up and refocused on fewer activities, especially their core 
competences (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Large firms were in the 1990s approximately half as 
diversified as they were in the 1980s (G. F. Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994). For a sample of 
large acquisitions made between 1971 and 1982, Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) find that by the 
end of 1989, acquirers had divested almost 44% of the target companies. Contrary to the wave 
of mergers in the 1960s and 1970s, takeovers in the 1980s tended towards consolidation and 
specialization. They were characterized in some cases as correctives to the previous wave of 
mergers (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). Moreover, this new wave 
of acquisitions was able to take place because Reagan’s antitrust policy allowed practically any 
type of merger (G. F. Davis et al., 1994). 
Increased pressure to maximize shareholder value was also transmitted through the  
introduction of new technologies, downsizing their workforce and offshoring (Fligstein & Shin, 
2007; Milberg & Winkler, 2013). As a consequence, transnational NFCs increasingly redefined 
their core competences to focus on innovation, product strategy, marketing – in general higher 
value added activities - while reducing direct ownership of non-core activities (i.e. those 
associated with lower value added) (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). Moreover, 
economic globalization, technological innovation and deregulation triggered another merger 
wave in the 1990s, this time global in dimension, with the European and Asian takeover 
market becoming more important and cross-border transactions growing substantially 




higher concentration along with the growth in intangible assets were considered to enable 
technological barriers that limit competition among firms and, therefore, create monopoly 
rents (Kurz, 2017; Pagano, 2014). Simultaneously, multinational NFCs have been implementing 
tax avoidance strategies through a variety of ways such as manipulating transfer prices, 
internal loans from affiliates in low tax countries to those located in high tax countries and 
assigning common expenses such as R&D to high tax countries (Huizinga & Laeven, 2008).  
Our results not only show that, for the aggregate, the financial turn of accumulation 
hypothesis does not hold, but also points towards those other strategies followed by NFCs. In 
terms of assets, the biggest increase was verified in ‘unidentified miscellaneous assets’ in 
which ‘goodwill’ has a dominant role. ‘Other intangibles’ such as patents, copyrights and 
licenses are also part of that category and partly reflect the movement towards higher value 
added activities.  Of the rest of the financial assets that can be identified, it is FDI that 
demonstrates the highest increase. Strikingly, neither intangibles (goodwill and other 
intangibles) nor FDI support financial accumulation while, in fact, both of them may indicate 
other changes experienced by NFCs: M&As, reorientation towards core activities, tax 
avoidance and offshoring respectively. 
This does not mean that no financial asset has increased in proportion, as is the case for ‘cash 
and short-term investments’ since the 1990s. However, the fact that NFCs are holding a higher 
proportion of cash and short term investments is not related to an increase in the flow of 
financial income but to other motives. For example, corporate finance literature identifies 
different groups of answers for this phenomenon such as growth opportunities (Fazzari, 
Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder, & Poterba, 1988; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999), 
riskier cash flows (Acharya, Almeida, & Campello, 2007; Bates, Kahle, & Stulz, 2009), tax costs 
associated with repatriating foreign income (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, & Twite, 2007), R&D 
activities (Brown & Petersen, 2011; Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 2012) and agency issues 




financialisation theory, the accumulation of cash and liquid assets is regarded more as wasted 
resources rather than profitable investments. In relation to this literature on cash holdings, our 
results point towards the direction of tax motives but also riskier cash flows and uncertainty 
since the largest increase in liquid assets is verified for smaller firms. 
The analysis in terms of uses of cash does not support either the financial turn of accumulation 
hypothesis. Financial investments represent a relatively minor and constant use of cash over 
the period. This is a clear indication that financial investments have not displaced capital 
expenditures in terms of use of funds or, what is the same, that real investment has not been 
crowded-out by financial investment. 
This finding is not entirely inconsistent with the financialisation literature. Most econometric 
studies, rather than evaluating the effect of financial investment as determinants for capital 
expenditures, have tested the impact of interest income over physical investment. Negative 
and significant values of the estimated parameters are thus interpreted as a proof of the turn 
to financial accumulation (Hecht, 2014; Orhangazi, 2008; Stockhammer, 2004) even though 
liquid financial assets are found to have a positive effect on investment when they are 
included (Davis, 2017; Hecht, 2014). Davis (2017) interprets these positive results as due to the 
greater flexibility provided by liquid financial assets in order to support real investment, and 
the possible complementarities between the financial and nonfinancial components of their 
business (for example, store-issued credit cards supporting the sales of non-financial 
products). Without carrying an econometric analysis, our results also go in the direction of an 
absence of crowding-out. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has contributed to the literature on the financialisation of NFCs by providing an in-
depth empirical analysis of the dynamics it involves in the USA. We identified that the 




shareholder value orientation and the engagement of NFCs in financial activities. The 
engagement can be, at the same time, of two types: one related to financial payouts and 
another related to financial income obtained due to the increased acquisition of financial 
assets. Our primary concern has been to scrutinize the empirical evidence regarding the 
second type of engagement which we defined as the financial turn of accumulation 
hypothesis. The main contribution of this paper has been to provide empirical evidence for the 
aggregate of NFCs (but also for different sizes considered on their own), that rejects that 
hypothesis.  
The evidence traditionally used in the literature to sustain the financial turn of accumulation 
hypothesis usually shows an increase in the financial assets held by NFCs along with higher 
proportion of financial income. However, in terms of assets, one of the main changes has been 
the growth of goodwill. In the FAUSA, this asset is part of a miscellaneous category classified as 
financial even though most of their assets are intangibles. Foreign Direct Investment is another 
asset which has increased and is considered as financial by the FAUSA although it should not 
be necessarily considered as such. Far from supporting the financial turn of accumulation 
hypothesis, the increase in intangibles in general, goodwill in particular, along with FDI (and its 
location) may indicate other paths followed by US NFCs. To our knowledge, these are the 
refocusing in higher value added activities, M&As, tax avoidance and internationalization. 
In terms of financial assets, only ‘cash and short-term investments’ have increased since the 
beginnings of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the proportion of financial income over total income is 
fairly low and, more important, has been decreasing in the last years. ‘Receivables’ and ‘other 
investments and advances’ have remained fairly constant (or even decreased) while, at the 
same time, the proportion of NFCs with a significant amount of those assets has decreased 
over the past 25 years.  
Apart from the financial turn of accumulation hypothesis, we emphasized that the introduction 




financial activities through an increase in financial payouts were also part of the dynamics 
involved in the financialisation of nonfinancial corporations. By showing the dramatic increase 
in share buybacks as a percentage of use of funds we provided evidence that supports these 
ideas. 
Looking forward, we identify some paths that would be interesting to explore. Firstly, if 
decreasing real investment over the last few decades cannot be explained as being crowded-
out by financial-profit-seeking investment, then we are in need of new explanations. Secondly, 
if financial income is not a relevant source of income, then future investigations should aim to 
find other ways by which NFCs are able to maintain, at the same time, strategies of downsizing 
and distribution to shareholders, i.e. the paradox of profits without investment. Examples of 
these other paths are the financialisation—offshoring nexus (Auvray & Rabinovich, 2019) and 
market power and technological changes (Durand & Gueuder, 2018; Rikap, 2018). 
A corollary of the financial turn of accumulation hypothesis is that NFCs are increasingly 
becoming or behaving as financial rentiers (Davis, 2016). Although our results reject the 
financial turn of accumulation hypothesis, they do not imply that no type of rentierization is 
happening regarding NFCs, but only that, if there is any rentierization, it does not seem to be 
financial. On the contrary, the growing importance of intangibles in aggregate terms points 
toward a type of business model that is more dependent on technological and intellectual 
rents, such as the case of pharmaceutical sector (Montalban & Sakinç, 2013), electronics 
(Dedrick, Kraemer, & Linden, 2010) or internet platforms (Haucap & Heimeshoff, 2014). This 
also seems an interesting path to continue. 
Finally, although in this article we have shown that financial turn of accumulation is not a 
strategy followed in general, further studies should focus on the determinants of those cases 
in which NFCs do mimic FCs. In this paper we have indicated two ways in order to do that. 
First, it would be necessary to focus on those cases with a significant proportion of 




information regarding income from financial division showing that, for them, financial income 















Financial Acquisitions + 
Increasing Proportion of 
Financial Income 
Lazonick & O’Sullivan (2000) X X     
Aglietta (2000) X X    
Boyer (2000) X X X   
Stockhammer (2004) X X X  
Crotty (2005)     X   
Krippner (2005)    X  
Froud et al (2006) X X     
Bellamy Foster (2007)    X  
Orhangazi (2008) X X X   
Milberg (2008)  X X  
Van Treeck (2008) X X X   
Dallery (2009) X X X  
Demir (2009)     X   
Clévenot, Guy and Mazier (2010) X X X  
Hein & Van Treeck (2010) X X     
Onaran et al (2011) X X   
Baud & Durand (2012) X X X  X  
Lapavitsas (2013)       X 
Lin & Tomaskovic-Devey (2013)    X  
Hecht (2014) X X X   
Kliman & Williams (2015)     X  
Epstein (2015) X X X  
Mason (2015) X X     
Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2015)    X  
Davis (2016) X X X   
Seo et al (2016) X X X  
Barradas (2017) X X X   
Tori & Onaran (2018) X X X  
 
Table 2. Summary of data 
  
Financial Accounts of the USA - 
Tables B.103 and L.103 
Statistics of Income - 







Consolidated Yes Yes Yes 
Geographical scope Domestic Domestic 
Domestic and 
International 




Financial 8 items 2 items 4 items 
Nonfinancial - 2 items 4 items 
Non-
Identifiable 
1 item 2 items 1 item 
Sources of financial 
incomea 
- 4/6 itemsb 2 items 
Cash Flowa - - 15 items 




Table 3. Composition of assets, NFCs, 1950-2015  
 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-99 00-09 10-15 
Non-Financial Assets 0.778 0.754 0.740 0.693 0.600 0.536 0.530 
Financial assets less unidentified miscellaneous assets 0.221 0.242 0.227 0.210 0.230 0.236 0.263 
Unidentified miscellaneous assets 0.001 0.003 0.033 0.097 0.171 0.228 0.207 
Note: Financial assets measured as a proportion of total assets. See additional details on 
variable definitions in Table A1. 
Source: Table B.103 and L.103, FAUSA. 
Table 4. Corporations with reported income from financial divisions and its proportion over 
total income 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average 
Alliance Data Systems Corp  0.497 0.469 0.476 0.471 0.452 0.462 0.498 0.475 
Altria Group Inc. 0.047 0.025 0.079     0.050 
Boeing Co  0.014 0.013 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.010 
Cabelas Inc  0.138 0.140 0.132 0.133 0.151 0.161 0.179 0.148 
Calatlantic Group Inc  0.095 0.141 0.124 0.090 0.072 0.061 0.050 0.090 
Carmax Inc  0.045 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.043 0.046 0.043 
Caterpillar Inc  0.055 0.028 0.035 0.035 0.038 0.035 0.046 0.039 
Cavco Industries Inc   0.085 0.101 0.092 0.097 0.083  0.092 
D R Horton Inc  0.045 0.051 0.054 0.058 0.062 0.043 0.039 0.050 
Eplus Inc  0.044 0.040 0.041 0.042 0.030 0.029  0.038 
Ford Motor Co  0.079 0.072 0.073 0.068 0.070 0.082 0.091 0.076 
General Electric Co  0.337 0.348 0.327 0.316 0.297 0.090 0.083 0.257 
General Motors Co  0.022 0.028 0.032 0.036 0.050 0.061 0.074 0.043 
Greenbrier Companies Inc  0.042 0.028 0.031 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.099 0.044 
Harley-davidson Inc  0.142 0.124 0.116 0.110 0.107 0.116 0.122 0.119 
Hovnanian Entrprs Inc    0.004 0.005 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.035 0.019 0.020 
Hp Inc  0.003 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.000  0.003 
Intl Business Machines Corp  0.036 0.031 0.034 0.032 0.034 0.040 0.040 0.035 
Kb Home  0.041 0.013 0.049 0.047 0.063 0.059 0.052 0.046 
Lennar Corp  0.137 0.130 0.125 0.114 0.130 0.132 0.118 0.126 
Lithia Motors Inc   0.025 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.036   0.032 
Mdc Holdings Inc    0.096 0.084 0.077 0.055 0.053 0.073 
Meritage Homes Corp.       0.033 0.033 
Navistar International Corp  0.018 0.014 0.009 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.022 0.015 
Nvr Inc  0.022 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.017 0.020 0.021 0.020 
Paccar Inc  0.074 0.054 0.057 0.061 0.057 0.056 0.063 0.060 
Pitney Bowes Inc  0.118 0.115 0.101 0.120 0.114 0.114 0.107 0.113 
Pultegroup Inc  0.087 0.077 0.074 0.054 0.046 0.048 0.046 0.062 
Snap-on Inc  0.025 0.043 0.053 0.055 0.061 0.067 0.076 0.054 
Sotheby's  0.019 0.015 0.029 0.031 0.040 0.058 0.075 0.038 
Textron Inc  0.021 0.009 0.018 0.011 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.011 
TRI Pointe Group Inc.      0.027 0.031 0.029 
Xerox Corp  0.034 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.029 0.027  0.031 
TOTAL 0.078 0.074 0.079 0.076 0.076 0.069 0.078 0.072 
 
Note: Income from financial divisions measured as a proportion of total income. See additional 
details on variable definitions in Table A1. 





Figure 1. Selected financial assets, NFCs, 1946-2015 
 
Note: Financial assets measured as a proportion of total assets. See additional details on 
variable definitions in Table A1. 
Source: Table B.103 and L.103, FAUSA. 
Figure 2. US FDI stock in selected OECD countries, 1985-2011 (left) and selected developing 
countries, 2001-2012 (right)  
Note: Percentages calculated as a proportion of total stock in OECD countries (left), and total 
stock in developing countries (right). 




Figure 3. Selected assets, NFCs, 1961-2016 
 
Note: Assets measured as a proportion of total assets. See additional details on variable 
definitions in Table A1. 
Source: Compustat. 
Figure 4. Selected assets, FCs, 1961-2016 
 
Note: Assets measured as a proportion of total assets. See additional details on variable 






Figure 5. NFCs with significant proportion of Receivables and Other Investment and Advances, 
1950-2016  
 
Note: Assets measured as a proportion of total assets. See additional details on variable 
definitions in Table A1. 
Source: Compustat. 
Figure 6. Components of financial income relative to total income (left) and cash flow (right), 
NFCs, 1955-2012 
 
Note: Cash flow calculated as profits + depreciation allowances, following Krippner’s (2005) 
methodology. See additional details on variable definitions in Table A1. 




Figure 7. Interest income and financial assets, NFCs, 1969-2016 
 
Note: Assets measured as a proportion of total assets and interest income measured as a 
proportion of total income. See additional details on variable definitions in Table A1. 
Source: Compustat. 
Figure 8. NFCs with significant proportion of Interest Income, 1966-2016 
Note: Interest income measured as a proportion of total income. See additional details on 
variable definitions in Table A1. 




Figure 9. Selected sources of funds, NFCs, 1971-2016 
 
Note: Sources of funds measured as a proportion of an estimated aggregation of sources of 
funds. See additional details on variable definitions in Table A1. 
Source: Compustat. 
Figure 10. Selected uses of funds, NFCs, 1971-2016 
 
Note: Uses of funds measured as a proportion of an estimated aggregation of uses of funds. 





















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 12. Components of financial Income, NFCs, 1961, 1962, 2004-2013 
  


































































Figure 13. Selected assets, NFCs, 1961-2016. Top 1% and Lower 50% in asset size 
 
Note: Assets measured as a proportion of total assets. See additional details on variable 
definitions in Table A1. 
Source: Compustat. 
Assets - Top 1%
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Table A1. Definitions of variables in figures and tables 
Variable Source 
Figure 1 
Checkable deposits and currency Financial Accounts of the USA, Table B.103 
Time and savings deposits Financial Accounts of the USA, Table B.103 
Money market fund shares Financial Accounts of the USA, Table B.103 
Debt securities Financial Accounts of the USA, Table B.103 
Loans Financial Accounts of the USA, Table B.103 
Trade receivables Financial Accounts of the USA, Table B.103 
US direct investment abroad Financial Accounts of the USA, Table B.103 
Mutual fund shares Financial Accounts of the USA, Table B.103 
Figures 3, 4, 5, 7, 13, A1 
Cash and Short-Term Investments Compustat Data Item 1 
Receivables  Compustat Data Item 2 
Inventories Compustat Data Item 3 
Net Property, Plant and Equipment Compustat Data Item 8 
Investments and Advances - Equity Method Compustat Data Item 31 
Investments and Advances - Other Compustat Data Item 32 
Goodwill Compustat Data Item 204 
Other Intangibles than Goodwill = Intagibles - Goodwill Compustat Data Item 33, 204 
Other Assets Compustat Data Item 69 
Sales Compustat Data Item 12 
Figures 6, 12, A2, A3, A5 
Other interest SOI 
Interest on government bonds SOI 
Net Capital Gain SOI 
Net gain, noncapital assets SOI 
Dividends domestic corporations SOI 
Dividends foreign corporations SOI 
Interest Paid SOI 
Financial Profitability = (Other interest + Interest on government 
bonds + Net Capital and Noncapital Gain + Dividends - Interest 
Paid)/Net Income SOI 
Figures 7, 8, A3 
Interest Income Compustat Data Item 62 
Dividend Income Compustat Data Item 55 
Figure 9 
Income Before Extraordinary Items Compustat Data Item 123 
Depreciation and Amortization Compustat Data Item 125 
Other Funds from Operations Compustat Data Item 217 
Sale of Property, Plant and Equipment Compustat Data Item 107 
Sale of Common and Preferred Stock  Compustat Data Item 108 
Net Long-Term Debt Issuance = Long-Term Debt Issuance - Long-
Term Debt Reduction  Compustat Data Items 111, 114 
Total estimated sources = Income Before Extraordinary Items + 
Depreciation and Amortization + Other Funds from Operations + 
Sale of Property, Plant and Equipment + Sale of Common and 
Preferred Stock + Net Long-Term Debt Issuance + Deferred Taxes + 
Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Operations 
Compustat Data Item 123, 125, 217, 107, 
108, 111, 114, 126, 124 
Figures 10 
Net Increase in Investments = Increase in Investments - Sale of 
Investments Compustat Data Item 113 
Capital Expenditures Compustat Data Item 128 
Acquisitions Compustat Data Item 129 
Other Investing Activities  Compustat Data Item 310 
Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock Compustat Data Item 115 
Cash Dividends Compustat Data Item 127 
Cash and Cash Equivalents Compustat Data Item 274 
Total estimated uses = Net Increase in Investments + Capital 
Expenditures + Acquisitions + Other Investing Activities + Purchase 
Compustat Data Item 113, 128, 129, 310, 
115, 127, 274, 309, 106, 302, 304 
 
 
of Common and Preferred Stock + Cash Dividends + Cash and Cash 
Equivalents + Change in Short-Term Investments + Equity in Net Loss 
+ Net Receivables 
Figures 11, A4 
Notes and accounts receivable less reserve SOI 
Inventories SOI 
Cash, Government obligations and other current assets SOI 
Other investments and loan SOI 
Depreciable assets acumulated depreciation SOI 
Other capital assets less reserves SOI 
Table 3 
Non-Financial Assets Financial Accounts of the USA, Table B.103 
Financial assets less unidentified miscellaneous assets 
Financial Accounts of the USA, Table B.103 
and L.103 
Unidentified miscellaneous assets 
Financial Accounts of the USA, Table B.103 
and L.103 
Table 4 




We define the ratio of portfolio income as calculated by Krippner and Crotty in the following 
way (we do not take into account depreciation allowances but it does not change the result): 𝑅𝑝𝑖 = 𝐼𝑓𝐼𝑓 + 𝐼𝑛𝑓 − 𝐶𝑓 − 𝐶𝑛𝑓 
 
Where 𝑅𝑝𝑖 is the ratio of portfolio income, 𝐼𝑓 financial income, 𝐼𝑛𝑓 non-financial income, 𝐶𝑓 
financial costs and 𝐶𝑛𝑓 nonfinancial costs. 
We are interested to know why this ratio could be moving so we calculate total differential of 𝑅𝑝𝑖. 
d𝑅𝑝𝑖 = (𝐼𝑛𝑓 − 𝐶𝑓 − 𝐶𝑛𝑓). d𝐼𝑓(𝐼𝑓 + 𝐼𝑛𝑓 − 𝐶𝑓 − 𝐶𝑛𝑓)2 − 𝐼𝑓 . d𝐼𝑛𝑓(𝐼𝑓 + 𝐼𝑛𝑓 − 𝐶𝑓 − 𝐶𝑛𝑓)2 + 𝐼𝑓d𝐶𝑓(𝐼𝑓 + 𝐼𝑛𝑓 − 𝐶𝑓 − 𝐶𝑛𝑓)2+ 𝐼𝑓d𝐶𝑛𝑓(𝐼𝑓 + 𝐼𝑛𝑓 − 𝐶𝑓 − 𝐶𝑛𝑓)2 




Figure A1. Selected assets, NFCs, 1961-2016 
 
Note: Assets measured as a proportion of sales. See additional details on variable definitions in 
Table A1. 
Source: Compustat.  
 
 
Figure A2. Net financial profitability, NFCs, 1955-2012 
 
Note: Financial profitability calculated as “financial income – financial expenses” as a 
proportion of profits. The upper figure does not include dividends from subsidiaries as part of 





Figure A3. Financial income, NFCs, 1969-2016 
  
Note: Financial income measured as a proportion of total income. See additional details on 
variable definitions in Table A1. 
Source: Compustat and SOI.  
 
 
Figure A4. Selected assets, Manufacturing, 1959-2013 
  
















































































































































































































































Figure A5. Components of financial Income, Manufacturing, 1961, 1962, 2004-2013 
 
Note: Financial income measured as a proportion of total income. See additional details on variable definitions in Table A1. 
Source: SOI. 
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